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Credit ratings produced by the major credit rating agencies (CRAs) aim to measure the creditworthiness, or
more specifically the relative creditworthiness of companies, i.e. their ability to meet their debt servicing
obligations. In principle, the rating process focuses on the fundamental long-term credit strength of a company.
It is typically based on both public and private information, except for unsolicited ratings, which focus only
on public information. The basic rationale for using ratings is to achieve information economies of scale
and solve principal-agent problems. Partly for the same reasons, the role of credit ratings has expanded
significantly over time. Regulators, banks and bondholders, pension fund trustees and other fiduciary agents
have increasingly used ratings-based criteria to constrain behaviour. As a result, the influence of the opinions
of CRAs on markets appears to have grown considerably in recent years.
One aspect of this development is its potential impact on market dynamics (i.e. the timing and path
of asset price adjustments, credit spreads, etc.), either directly, as a consequence of the information
content of ratings themselves, or indirectly, as a consequence of the “hardwiring” of ratings into
regulatory rules, fund management mandates, bond covenants, etc.
When considering the impact of ratings and rating changes, two conclusions are worth highlighting.
– First, ratings correlate moderately well with observed credit spreads, and rating changes with changes
in spreads. However, other factors, such as liquidity, taxation and historical volatility clearly also
enter into the determination of spreads. Recent research suggests that reactions to rating changes
may also extend beyond the immediately-affected company to its peers, and from bond to equity
prices. Furthermore, this price reaction to rating changes seems to be asymmetrical, i.e. more
pronounced for downgrades than for upgrades, and may be more significant for equity prices than
for bond prices.
– Second, the hardwiring of regulatory and market rules, bond covenants, investment guidelines,
etc., to ratings may influence market dynamics, and potentially lead to or magnify threshold
effects. The more that different market participants adopt identical ratings-linked rules, or are
subject to similar ratings-linked regulations, the more “spiky” the reaction to a credit event is likely
to be. This reaction may include, in some cases, the emergence of severe liquidity pressures. Efforts
have recently been made, notably with support from the rating agencies themselves, to encourage
a more systematic disclosure of rating triggers and to renegotiate and smooth the possibly more
NB: This paper represents a joint effort by a group of European central bank experts co-ordinated by François Haas (Banque de France). It has
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T
his paper summarises the work conducted
by a group of economists from various
European central banks over the summer of
2003. It is intended to add to the ongoing debate on
major rating agencies and their methodologies.
The analysis and policy considerations proposed are
based on a review of the literature and are those of
the authors; and they do not necessarily reflect the
positions of their respective institutions.
The paper is aimed at contributing to the current
debate on this topic in two ways: first, by providing
a factual exposition of the significance and evolving
use of credit ratings in the financial markets and,
second, by identifying the possible impacts that such
evolving use may have on market dynamics
(i.e. the timing and path of asset price adjustments,
the dynamics of credit spreads, the potential
magnifying effects that rating changes can trigger)
and analysing how credit rating agencies (CRAs)
have responded to the increasing, and sometimes
conflicting, demands that market participants put
on credit ratings. In doing so, the paper also provides
a comprehensive review of literature on credit
ratings and CRAs.
The paper is organised as follows: section 1 explains
how the role of ratings has evolved in financial
markets; section 2 examines different channels
through which ratings and rating changes may
impact on market dynamics and contribute to asset
price movements; section 3 discusses rating
methodology and the meaning of some recent
developments in this field; and section 4 concludes
by pointing to some policy implications and issues
derived from the preceding developments.
An appendix surveys some key issues in credit risk
measurement.
destabilising forms of rating triggers. However, the lack of a clear disclosure regime makes it difficult
to assess how far this process has evolved. Questions also remain as to the extent to which
ratings-based criteria introduce a fundamentally new element into market behaviour, or, conversely,
the extent to which they are simply a variant of more traditional contractual covenants.
Rating agencies strive to provide credit assessments that remain broadly stable through the course of
the business cycle (rating “through the cycle”). Agencies and other analysts frequently contrast the
fundamental credit analysis on which ratings are based with market sentiment — measured for example
by bond spreads — which is arguably subject to more short-term influences. Agencies are adamant
that they do not directly incorporate market sentiment into ratings (although they may use market
prices as a diagnostic tool). On the contrary, they make every effort to exclude transient market sentiment.
However, as reliance on ratings grows, CRAs are being increasingly expected to satisfy a widening
range of constituencies, with different, and even sometimes conflicting, interests: issuers and “traditional”
asset managers will look for more than a simple statement of near-term probability of loss, and will
stress the need for ratings to exhibit some degree of stability over time. On the other hand,
mark-to-market traders, active investors and risk managers may seek more frequent indications of
credit changes. Hence, in the wake of major bankruptcies with heightened credit stress, rating agencies
have been under considerable pressure to provide higher-frequency readings of credit status, without
loss of quality. So far, they have responded to this challenge largely by adding more products to their
traditional range, but also through modifications in the rating process.
The rating process and the range of products offered by rating agencies have thus evolved over time,
with, for instance, an increasing emphasis on the analysis of liquidity risks, a new focus on the
hidden liabilities of companies and an increased use of market-based tools. It is too early, however,
to judge whether these changes should simply be regarded as a refinement of the agencies’ traditional
methodology or whether they suggest a more fundamental shift in the approach to credit risk
measurement. For the same reason, it is not possible to draw any firm conclusions about changes in
the effects of credit ratings on market dynamics.Market dynamics associated with credit ratings: a literature review
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1 The general adverse selection problem was introduced by George Akerlof in 1970 (see “The market for lemons”, Quaterly Journal of Economics,
Vol. 54, pp. 488-500). In the case of bond markets, the problem implies that non-rated markets are characterised by very low spreads between the
interest rates paid by strong issuers and those paid by weak issuers. An objective assessment of credit risk significantly increases this spread,
benefiting strong issuers, but harming weak issuers.
2 Short-term rating of commercial papers was first introduced in the 1970s. Bank ratings in the form of financial strength ratings measure credit risk for
a bank in the absence of any assumed support from governmental authorities. Fitch also produces bank ratings which factor in the likelihood of support.
Asset-backed ratings measure credit risk on structured products in which the rated liabilities are backed by a dedicated set of assets, e.g. asset-backed
commercial papers backed by trade receivables, or collateralised debt obligations (CDOs) backed by commercial bank loans. Liquidity rating assessments,
which were formally introduced by Moody’s in 2002 for speculative grade borrowers, are designed to supplement short-term ratings and to give an
assessment of vulnerability to sudden loss of market access. Additionally, there are sovereign ratings, both for industrialised countries and emerging
market borrowers. This type of rating is very different from the others in its conception of credit risk, and lies beyond the scope of this paper.
1| The expanding use of ratings
1|1 A tentative definition of ratings
Ratings are credit opinions
Ratings provided by CRAs are a measure of the
long-term  fundamental credit strength of
companies, i.e. their long-term ability and
willingness to meet their debt servicing obligations.
More specifically, ratings apply either to the
general creditworthiness of an obligor or to its
obligations with respect to a particular debt security
(senior and subordinated bonds, either secured or
unsecured, collateralised debt structures, etc.) or
other specific financial obligations.
CRAs base their analyses on a company’s financial
statements, franchise value, management quality and
competitive position in its industry, and seek to predict
credit performance — the servicing of debt obligations
in full and on time — under a range of macroeconomic
and credit conditions, including stress situations. This
analysis is based not only on public information, but
also on private/confidential information which
companies agree to share with CRAs.
CRAs stress that ratings are opinions (see Fons, 2002).
These opinions, which stem from fundamental credit
analysis, are used to classify credit risk. In keeping with
their status as opinions, ratings are determined by a
rating committee (see Hilderman, 1999). As such,
ratings do not constitute a recommendation to buy,
sell or hold a particular security, and do not address
the suitability of an investment for a particular investor.
Inherent in this definition of ratings is the notion that
they are an ordinal measure of risk, but not necessarily
a cardinal one. Accordingly, all CRAs express the
outcome of their assessments in the form of symbols,
such as Aaa, AAA, etc., which more or less correspond
to each other across agencies. The division of the rating
scale into these buckets, and the subsequent assignment
of debt obligations to them, essentially reflects the
judgement and experience of rating agency staff,
supplemented in some areas by the use of models.
The economic rationale for the use of ratings
In economic terms, the rationale for using ratings,
and their growing “popularity” stems from their
ability to provide information economies of scale
on the one hand, and from their contribution to
solving principal-agent problems on the other.
Information economies of scale
Creditors and investors have found it efficient to use
ratings opinions in initiating and monitoring their
transactions because of the economies of scale
achieved in gathering and analysing information.
This, in turn, has facilitated the access of borrowers
to debt markets, by widening the investor pool and
reducing adverse selection problems resulting from
information asymmetries between investors and
issuers of debt,1 and has provided significant impetus
to the development of financial markets.
Principal-agent problems
Another way in which the use of ratings affects the
market is the pervasive “hardwiring” of rules and
guidelines to ratings. In all cases, the principal
motivation for hardwiring to ratings is the same: to
formulate a simple and verifiable rule with low
transaction costs, so as to be able to monitor and
constrain the actions of agents. In economic
terminology, ratings are used to solve principal-agent
problems, that is, a principal’s problem of maximising
incentives for agents to perform well, when it is hard
to observe or directly control their actions.
1|2 The expanding use of credit ratings
Indeed, precisely due to the aforementioned qualities
of ratings, interest in credit rating services and the
demand for a wider range of ratings, beyond the credit
assessment of traditional corporate bonds, have
significantly increased2 over the past three decades.
Regulators (in regulations), banks and bondholdersMarket dynamics associated with credit ratings: a literature review
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(in loan and bond covenants), pension fund trustees
and other fiduciary agents (in investment guidelines,
insurance company charters, etc.) have made
increasing use of ratings-based constraints in their
rules. As a result, the use of ratings and the influence
of the opinions of CRAs on securities markets have
grown significantly, to the extent that ratings are now
ubiquitous in financial markets, and increasingly act
as benchmarks or creditworthiness standards, far
beyond their initial purpose. This role can be
highlighted in the area of regulation as well as in
debt issuance and portfolio management.
“Core clients”: issuers and fixed-income investors
Debt issuers
From the outset, debt issuers have been among the
“natural” users of ratings, and increasingly so, given
that, although ratings may not determine their ability
to enter financial markets, they do at least contribute
to determining their financing costs and the quality of
their investor bases. Hence, preserving or achieving a
desired rating is frequently incorporated into corporate
goals and represents an integral part of the financing
strategy of companies. Indeed, through the use of
specific services offered by CRAs, such as Moody’s
Rating Assessment Service or Standard & Poor’s
(S&P’s) Rating Evaluation Service, companies are able
to “monitor” the behaviour of their ratings under
different scenarios. The use of rating triggers, that is to
say covenants that imply a change in the characteristics
of an existing financing instrument, should the rating
of the issuer/borrower change, are an example of how
investors can use ratings to tailor their investments by
issuer. Such ratings-based triggers were initially mostly
found in bank loan covenants. They became
increasingly popular, however, and took diversified
forms, in bond issuance in the mid to late 1990s
(see below).
Bond investors and portfolio managers
Ratings provided by recognised CRAs play a central
role in portfolio governance, especially for small to
medium-sized asset managers who lack the resources
to develop reliable internal credit assessment systems.
However, even for major asset managers, the use of
internal credit assessment systems is frequently
limited to supplementing external ratings when the
latter are not available or when they provide diverging
signals. The use of ratings in portfolio governance and
investment mandates appears to be twofold:
(i) ratings-based guidelines contribute to determining
the universe of eligible assets — within this universe
ratings (in conjunction with maturity constraints) are
also used to determine the maximum, and sometimes
minimum, proportion of authorised holdings — and
(ii) these ratings-based guidelines also shape the
reactions of asset managers when faced with changes
in the credit quality of their holdings (see Report of
the Committee on the Global Financial System, 2003).
Other market participants
Market participants, be they investors, market makers
or broker-dealers, also rely extensively on external
ratings for the assessment of their trading
counterparties (selection of credit counterparties and
definition of credit limits). This is especially true with
regard to the short-term management of liquidity
(repo transactions, for instance) and over-the-counter
derivative transactions (swaps, options, etc.): the
creditworthiness of market participants, as assessed
by CRAs, determines either the conditions (costs)
under which those participants can access the market
(the frequency of margin calls, the magnitude of
collateralisation that they will be asked to provide)
or even their very access to markets.
In the management of their portfolios, and the
implementation of monetary policy, central banks
also frequently rely on ratings provided by CRAs, in
ways similar to that of other market participants, in
the definition of eligible assets, either for the
investment of own funds and foreign exchange
reserves or as monetary policy collateral. In the latter
case, the credit quality of eligible assets impacts on
the required level of collateralisation and risk controls.
Regulators
The importance of ratings-based regulations has
traditionally been particularly visible in the United
States, where it can be traced back to the 1930s. These
regulations affect not only banks, but also insurers,
pension funds, mutual funds and broker-dealers,
restricting or prohibiting the purchase of bonds with
“low” ratings (usually below BBB), imposing variable
capital charges depending on the rating of the holdings
or easing the issuance conditions or disclosure
requirements for securities carrying a “satisfactory”
rating. While ratings-based regulation appears to be less
common overall in Europe, a similar approach can be
found in the Capital Adequacy Directive in the area of
bank regulation. More generally, the Basel II project,
in its “standardised approach to credit risk” establishes
fixed credit risk weights for each supervisory category
and relies explicitly on “external credit assessments”.Market dynamics associated with credit ratings: a literature review
Banque de France • Financial Stability Review • No. 4 • June 2004 57
2| Ratings and market dynamics:
do ratings and changes in ratings influence market dynamics?
When considering the possible impacts of ratings (and,
more specifically, changes in ratings) on market
dynamics (i.e. the behaviour of asset prices and spreads),
it is necessary to distinguish between a direct impact,
resulting from the information content of a rating
change, and an indirect impact, stemming from the
“hardwiring” of regulations and guidelines to ratings.
2|1 The information content of ratings
and reactions to changes in ratings
For bond ratings to have a direct, information-related
impact on spreads and spread dynamics, they must
contain relevant pricing information that investors
cannot obtain from other sources at comparable cost.
The question of the information content of ratings has
been addressed (i) by analysing the relation between
bond yields and ratings and (ii) by studying price
reactions to rating changes.
Relationship between bond yields and ratings
The various studies that have tried to answer the
question of the information content of ratings in general
come to the conclusion that ratings do help explain
cross-sectional differences in yield spreads.3 In these
studies, ratings may, however, be a proxy for omitted,
publicly-available variables that affect the spreads.4
Indeed, even if ratings and rating changes do partly
explain observed spreads and their dynamics, there
remains a large part of these spreads that ratings
cannot explain. Additional factors, whose relative
importance varies according to the different studies,
therefore need to be included.
– Taxation. While ratings are found by Gabbi and
Sironi (2002) to be effectively the most important
factor determining primary yield spreads between
corporate bonds and the equivalent Treasury
securities, other factors, such as expected tax
treatment for bonds, are also important. However,
the structural efficiency5 of the market and liquidity
variables do not appear to be significant in
explaining the cross-sectional variability of spreads.6
– Systematic risk. According to Elton, Gruber,
Agrawal and Mann (2001), losses stemming from
expected defaults come last among the three
factors that can explain (i.e. break down)
corporate spreads — expected losses are found
to explain only 17.8% of the variation in the
spread. Differential taxes appear to be more
important and explain about 36% of the spread.
The remaining portion of the spread (more than
46%) is found to be closely related to the factors
commonly accepted as explaining risk premia
for common stocks, i.e. the Fama-French factors.7
Hence, a large portion of the spread seems to be
compensation for systematic risk, that cannot be
diversified away.
– Volatility. Campbell and Taksler (2003) analysed
the effects of equity volatility on corporate bond
yields, and showed that idiosyncratic volatility
was directly related to the cost of borrowing for
corporate issuers. Furthermore, the results also
suggest that volatility can explain as much
cross-sectional variation in yields as credit ratings.
– Supply and demand. Using dealers’ quotes and
transaction prices for industrial bonds,
Collin-Dufresne, Goldstein and Martin (2001)
investigated the determinants of credit spread
changes. Their results show that variables, which
3 See, for example, Liu and Thakor (1984) and Kao and Wu (1990). Ederington et al. (1987) find that, conditional on economic and
company-specific variables, ratings do have explanatory power for bond yields.
4 See Galil (2002). See Appendix for more details and more references to the academic literature.
5 Such as fees charged to the issuer, the number of managers in the bond issuing syndicate, and the issuance process (private placement versus
public issue and fixed-priced versus open-priced issues).
6 The study was conducted on the primary corporate eurobond market and analysed spreads on eurobond issues completed by almost 600 major
corporations from 15 industrialised countries during the 1991-2001 period. In addition to the above-mentioned result, the study also showed that
bond investors’ reliance on rating agencies’ judgements increased over time during the sample period. Also, empirical evidence shows that rating
agencies adopt a “through-the-cycle” evaluation approach to obligors’ creditworthiness that is different to the forward-looking approach used by
bond investors. Finally, rating agencies’ discordance, as measured by a different numeric value of the assigned rating notch, appears to be
perceived by bond investors as a sign of (or simply reflects) a higher degree of uncertainty concerning the issuer’s default risk.
7 The excess return on the market (RM) factor, the “small minus big” (SMB) factor, and the “high minus low” (HML) factor.Market dynamics associated with credit ratings: a literature review
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8 Griffin and Sanvicente (1982), Ingram, Brooks and Copeland (1983), Holthausen and Leftwich (1985), Hand, Holthausen and Leftwich (1992) and
Goh and Ederington (1993).
9 Hand, Holthausen and Leftwich (1992) find asymmetrical results with respect to  reactions to rating downgrades and upgrades. They observe
significantly negative average excess bond and stock returns for downgrades, and a weaker positive effect for upgrades. However, when controlling
for expected rating changes the asymmetries disappear in bond returns but persist in stock returns. Similarly, according to Ederington, Goh and
Nelson (1996), the stock market reacts to downgrade information more quickly than analysts do and, in contrast to downgrades, upgrades do not
elicit any market response.
in theory determine credit spread changes, have
limited explanatory power. Rather, using
principal component analysis, they show that
most of the residuals are driven by a single factor.
Monthly credit spread changes appear to be
driven principally by local supply/demand
shocks that are independent of both credit-risk
factors and liquidity.
– Liquidity. Chen, Lesmond and Wei (2002) find
liquidity to also be an important factor explaining
corporate bond spreads, after controlling for credit
ratings, maturity, amounts outstanding and
volatility. These results indicate that liquidity is
indeed priced into corporate bonds.
Price reactions to rating changes
Numerous studies have focused on the price
reactions of bonds and equities to changes in ratings.
A recent study by Klinger and Sarig (2000), which
focuses on the refinement of Moody’s rating system
in 1982, shows that investors do indeed react to
changes in ratings if they are unexpected, in the same
way as they react to new information. Their test
was, however, conducted on a one-off event basis
that does not necessarily reflect the informational
content of ratings in future years. More generally,
while research conducted in this field8 usually yields
mixed results, two findings are worth highlighting.
– Reactions to bond rating downgrades percolate from
the affected company to its rivals, and from the bond
market to equity prices. Equity analysts revise their
earnings expectations downward for both the
downgraded company and its rivals, and the
extent of this reaction depends on the initial rating
and the size of the downgraded debt (Caton and
Goh, 2003).
– The price reaction to rating changes, and in particular
the effect on stock returns, is asymmetrical, i.e. the
market reacts more strongly to rating downgrades than
to rating upgrades,9 and ultimately this asymmetry
appears less significant for bonds than for stocks.
Several studies suggest that abnormal equity
returns following bond downgrades are negative,
whereas there is no significant abnormal equity
return reaction to upgrades. Holthausen and
Leftwich (1986) suggest that the difference between
one-year pre-announcement returns to upgrade and
downgrade is in the order of 20% to 30%. They find
no abnormal returns after the announcement of
upgrades, but do find evidence of abnormally low
returns in the quarter following a downgrade.
Dichev and Piotroski (2001) find negative abnormal
stock returns in the order of 10% to 14% in the
first year following downgrades. Furthermore,
the underperformance is more pronounced
for small companies with low credit quality.
The above findings could stem from the way in
which rating agencies produce their ratings or could
reflect the fact that rating agencies expend more
resources on detecting deteriorations in company
balance sheets than they do on detecting
improvements in earnings. A further explanation
is, of course, that stock markets overreact to rating
downgrades (see Dichev and Piotroski, 2001).
It could also be argued that the overreaction to
downgrades reflects the fact that downgrades
convey additional information: a downgrade signals
that the rated company has either decided not to
or proved unable to avoid the downgrade. This is
consistent with the role of ratings as coordination
mechanisms (see Boot and Milbourn, 2002).
2|2 The consequences of the more
widespread use of ratings
The effects of the hardwiring of rules
and regulations to ratings
As mentioned above, enshrining ratings into rules
and regulations is a possible answer to principal-agent
problems. At the same time, such hardwiring may
fuel specific market dynamics as it injects a dose of
automatism (and predictability) into the reactions of
the affected market participants to the initial rating
event, potentially magnifying threshold effects.
For instance, the point at which probabilities of
default have been found empirically to rise sharply
constitutes one of the most important divides in rating
scales (between BBB- and BB+), and one of the main
thresholds in the world of asset management, as itMarket dynamics associated with credit ratings: a literature review
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10 Securities rated from BBB+ to BB- are assigned a 100% risk weight in the new accord standard approach.
11 In October 1988, the market was surprised by the leveraged buyout of RJR Nabisco. Credit agencies lowered the credit rating of RJR Nabisco bonds
and the price of these bonds decreased by 17%. This led to investor demand for bond covenants for such events, and such covenants became
known as super poison put provisions. For a discussion on super poison put provisions see, for example, Bae, Klein and Padmaraj (1994),
Crabbe (1991) and Norton (1992).
12 A designated event is one in which the company’s shareholders generally benefit, to the detriment of bondholders. Such events include mergers,
takeovers, major stock repurchase plans and major distributions of assets to shareholders. If, after such an event, the credit rating agencies
downgrade the bond to below investment grade, the put option can be exercised.
separates “investment grade” securities from
“speculative grade” securities, which many
investors are not authorised to hold or may only
hold  in strictly limited quantities. Hence, the
downgrading of a bond issue (or an issuer) to below
that level may force asset managers to restructure
their portfolios, triggering a forced liquidation of
assets. More generally, the more that different
market participants are constrained by identical
ratings-linked rules or subject to similar
ratings-linked regulations, the more their reactions
can be expected to be identical in the event of a
credit event, and the more pronounced the effect
of such reactions is likely to be.
In this regard, it appears that investment mandates
offer different degrees of flexibility in the
management of guideline violations triggered by
changes in ratings (most notably downgrades).
Guidelines imposing an automatic and immediate
liquidation of the downgraded assets seem to be
less common than they were, and are increasingly
supplemented by flexible rules that either allow
the fund manager to keep the affected assets in
the portfolio (provided that overall these assets do
not represent more than a certain percentage of
the whole portfolio) or allow him to dispose of the
affected assets over a certain period of time. Such
flexibility is welcomed as it limits the risks of “fire
sales” that can fuel downward spirals in prices. At
the same time, however, expectations of such
liquidations, even if they are anticipated to take
place over a “certain” period of time instead of in
the period immediately following the credit event,
are likely to trigger “front running” behaviour by
other market participants, a situation that tends to
bring forward much of the ultimate price impact.
More generally, this trend toward increased
flexibility in the managing of rating events can be
seen as paralleling the progressive changes in
portfolio management from an initial “buy and
hold” approach to a more active, mark-to-market
approach. In the same vein, the framework of the
Basel II standard approach could smooth the major
discontinuity between “investment grade” and
“speculative grade” securities, as it spreads the
increase in weights across the rating scale.
Indeed, the BBB-/BB+ threshold is not a relevant
threshold for the setting of risk weights by
banking regulators.10
From a downgrade to a liquidity crisis:
rating triggers
Ratings-based triggers are intended to protect
lenders against credit deterioration and
asymmetric information problems, and lenders
are willing to pay for triggers by accepting lower
spreads/coupons. Hence, there is a clear
demand-side reason for issuing debt instruments
with embedded rating triggers. There is, however,
also a supply-side reason for rating triggers:
i.e. borrowers are willing to include such triggers
because without them lenders would probably
demand a higher initial spread on debt contracts.
Rating triggers attempt to offer protection to
investors, but, due to the way in which they work,
they could precipitate a liquidity crisis and/or even
contribute to extreme events such as bankruptcies.
The inclusion of rating triggers in debt contracts is
not new. The so-called “super poison put provisions”,
for example, that gained prominence in bonds issued
in late 1980s, following the RJR Nabisco buyout,
contained embedded rating triggers.11 A super poison
put provision allows bondholders to sell their bonds
to the issuing company at par value or at a premium
after the occurrence of a “designated event”12
combined with a “qualifying downgrade”. Hence,
super poison put provisions can be viewed as
conditional rating triggers, conditional on a specific
event or a set of events. The exact provisions varied
from issue to issue, creating uncertainty about the
strength of the protection offered in any particular
bond issue. In response to this uncertainty,
Standard & Poor’s began rating the event risk
protection of bonds with put provisions in July 1989.
The designs of ratings-based triggers vary, both in
form and in the identity of the contracting parties.
In general, a rating trigger provides creditors and
counterparties with certain rights in the event of a
borrower’s credit rating falling to, or below, a
specified level. The rights given to the creditors
usually vary from an increase in the nominal
coupon to a put option.
According to a recent survey by Moody’s (2001), out
of 771 US corporate issuers rated Ba1 or higher, only
12.5% reported no triggers, while the remainingMarket dynamics associated with credit ratings: a literature review
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13 For example, a situation in which a company is downgraded and, at the same time, has to redeem some of its long-term debt early  (rating trigger)
and simultaneously looses its access to the CP market (because of the downgrade).
14 See, for example, Johnson (2003) and Löffler (2003).
87.5% reported a total of 2,819 rating triggers
(see Moody’s Investors Service, 2001). Not only did
rating triggers appear to be widely used, but
situations in which a single issuer was subject to
multiple triggers were common at the time of the
survey. While there are reasons to believe that the
use of such features has since declined, no
comprehensive picture is available that would help
to accurately assess the current situation.
The table below shows common features of rating
triggers and their frequency.
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As can be seen in this table, contingency clauses
are diverse in nature, and hence their consequences,
if activated, may be wide-ranging.
– Collateral, L/Cs and bonding provisions are clauses
that are usually written into bank loan agreements.
When the clause is triggered, the mechanism does
not result in a change in the initial financing
conditions but requires the borrower to pledge
assets to guarantee its financing over time. Hence,
the impact of the triggered clause should mainly
be on the opportunity cost of capital.
– Pricing grids or adjustments in interest rates or
coupons are features found both in bonds and in
bank loans where the initial interest rate or
coupon is revised in the event of a change in the
borrower’s rating (or in some of its financial
ratios). The impact of the exercised trigger is a
mechanical increase in the cost of capital.
– Acceleration clauses may have more severe, or
sometimes even critical, effects. For example, for
a loan or bond initially issued for a long period,
the triggering of the clause may result in an
acceleration of repayments or even early
termination of credit. As mentioned above, these
types of clause are used both in bond contracts
and in bank loan agreements as well as in back-up
credit lines. Not only does the triggering of a
clause result in an increase in the cost of capital,
but also in an immediate need for new capital.
Two major problems associated with rating triggers
are worth highlighting.
– Rating triggers can contribute to “credit cliff”
situations. “Credit cliff” is market jargon for a
situation in which dire consequences,
i.e. compounding credit deterioration, possibly
leading to default, may be expected should
certain risk scenarios materialise. In this regard,
Standard & Poor’s (2001a) has stated that “in these
cases, if there is a rating change, it will
necessarily be a very substantial change (due to)
the entity’s greater sensitivity to credit quality
or a particular occurrence”. This can put material
pressure on the company’s liquidity or its
business. For example, when downgraded, the
position of a company that is performing poorly
will worsen as its cost of capital rises. Rating
triggers and other covenants, particularly when
combined, can contribute to the development of
such credit cliffs and may speed up the pace at
which the cost of capital increases due to credit
deterioration. This is especially the case in
situations where multiple triggers are set off
simultaneously, or when the triggering of one
clause leads to an accumulation of negative
consequences.13 It is not clear how CRAs take
these situations into account. Bonds rated at the
lowest investment-grade notch (where
traditionally a large proportion of these rating
triggers have been found) tend to suffer large
price falls when they are downgraded. Owing to
the above mentioned risks of self-fulfilling
effects, the presence of rating triggers may
reinforce the finding that rating agencies are only
willing to decide on a rating action when it is
unlikely to be reversed shortly afterwards.14
– Disclosure of ratings-based triggers by issuers has
until recently been incomplete and largely ignored
by analysts and investors. Present accounting
standards leave a significant degree of discretion
as to whether triggers need to be disclosed.
Under US (GAAP/FAS), UK (FRS) and
international  accounting standards (IAS) there isMarket dynamics associated with credit ratings: a literature review
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an obligation to disclose material triggers, but
material in this context means not only that the
contingent obligation is large, but that it potentially
has a significant bearing on the company’s
financial situation. For instance, these
requirements do not appropriately address
situations where an issuer/borrower has included
many “non material” triggers in its debt
covenants/bond issues. However, if there is
uncertainty as to whether the company is a going
concern, there should be a clear obligation to
disclose. Nonetheless, it has proved difficult to
obtain a comprehensive picture of the size of the
contingent liability of triggers, despite the fact that
this information is crucial for investors as well as
analysts and rating agencies in order to fully
apprehend the risks attached to a specific issue or
issuer.15 Efforts have been made in this area,
notably under pressure from rating agencies, to
encourage a more systematic disclosure of rating
triggers and to renegotiate and smooth the more
dangerous ones. A survey by Standard & Poor’s in
2002 among more than 1,000 US and European
investment-grade debt issuers revealed that about
half of these issuers were exposed to some sort of
ratings-linked contingent liability. However, fewer
than 3% exhibited serious vulnerability to rating
triggers or other contingent calls on liquidity which
could turn a moderate decline in credit quality into
a liquidity crisis (Standard & Poor’s, 2002).
Transparency and disclosure are important features
that could help mitigate some of the negative
aspects of rating triggers and other contingency
clauses. It is unlikely that systematic (mandatory)
disclosure of rating triggers and greater transparency
with regard to exposure to rating triggers could
prevent rating events from  disturbing markets once
the triggers are activated, but it could increase the
awareness of the situation in the market and promote
a longer-term view on the part of market
participants. The same holds true for covenants
based on balance sheet ratios. Furthermore, the
present context of incomplete transparency and
disclosure of rating triggers may be seen as
impacting on the price discovery mechanism of
fixed income products (and, by extension, equities)
as it results in an additional risk premium
associated with this “rating trigger” uncertainty.
This in turn may lead to a higher cost of capital
and higher yields than would have been the case
under a more transparent framework. Thus, the
“benefits” of these clauses are not fully exploited.
However, if rating triggers were systematically
disclosed from their inception, this information
would be priced in from the start in bond issues
(and stocks) and the number of triggers used in
debt issues of any single borrower would probably
be more limited. Moreover, it could also be argued
that the expected benefits (for issuers) from these
devices would prove illusory, as the relative prices
of the various debt instruments of an issuer/borrower
and its equity price would adjust to reflect the
existence of rating triggers in some debt
instruments, and that the benefits (in terms of
favourable financing conditions) stemming from
trigger-carrying instruments would be offset by
deteriorating financing conditions (and increased
volatility) for “unprotected” instruments. It is, of
course, unlikely that all rating triggers could be
disclosed, since there are private placements and
bank loan agreements with embedded options. Still,
greater transparency should have both direct and
indirect positive effects on credit markets.
15 Rating agencies cannot force an issuer to disclose the nature or extent of its use of rating triggers. If an issuer deems that public disclosure is not required
by securities laws or after inquiries made by investors or rating agencies, the issuer’s credit profile assessment cannot be completed.
3| The challenge: how to reconcile




The time horizon of ratings: ratings are ordinal
in the short term and cardinal in the long term
From an operational standpoint, the purpose of
ratings is to measure credit risk in terms of
probability of default, expected losses or likelihood
of timely payments in accordance with contractual
terms. CRAs are careful to stress, however, that these
estimates should not be seen as a short-term
outcome (i.e. one to two years), but rather should
be considered over a longer horizon (see Moody’s
Investors Service, 1999, FitchRatings, 2003 and
Standard & Poor’s, 2001b). Long term generally
appears to mean at least one or two business cycles.
Agencies will say that the time horizon is indefinite,Market dynamics associated with credit ratings: a literature review
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16 In times past, agencies stated that their aim was to rate “through the cycle”. This aim was achieved by examining the ability of the company to
continue servicing its debt under a range of stressful credit conditions, both in the macro economy at large and in the specific industry. More
recently, they have tended to downplay the through-the-cycle notion, arguing that business cycles have become more irregular.
17 These “proxies” are products developed by international rating agencies (for example, Riscalc by Moody’s, Creditmodel by Standard & Poor’s and
CRS by Fitch) to replicate their traditional through-the-cycle ratings in order to support credit risk management. These products enable customers
to buy the software and run analyses at any time.
18 It should be noted, however, that the composition and size of the ratings universe changed over this time period.
The graph below summarises the way in which
various credit assessment systems differ in terms of
both the time horizon for the assessment and
the resulting ratings volatility. The traditional
approach of CRAs is considered to be closest to a
pure through-the-cycle approach, whereas Merton-type,
structural models are closest to a pure point-in-time
approach. The internal rating based (IRB) approaches
of commercial banks are probably somewhere
between the two latter approaches. Although banks
traditionally use a one-year time horizon in their
probability of default estimations, in accordance with
the Basel II Consultative Paper 3, they have to use
longer time horizons when assigning ratings. Hence,
their probability of default estimates should move away
from the estimates of pure Merton-type models.
Ultimately, the positioning of each IRB system on this
“through-the-cycle” to “point-in-time” scale will depend
on the specific characteristics chosen by the individual
banks. Rating agency “proxies”17 (“quantitative credit
scoring models”) are positioned between IRBs and
traditional ratings since, although their credit
assessments should vary more than traditional agency
assessments owing to their more frequent revisions,
their methodology is designed to replicate traditional
through-the-cycle ratings (see sub-section 3|2).
The limits of “through-the-cycle” methodology
Increased volatility and downward momentum
Several academic studies have examined the behaviour
of credit ratings over time, for instance through the
analysis of credit upgrades and downgrades. Altman
and Kao (1992) for example analyse the stability of
newly issued Standard & Poor’s ratings for two sub-periods
(1970 to 1979 and 1980 to 1988). They show that for
every rating and time horizon (one to five years)
newly-rated issues from the earlier period exhibit
greater stability.18 Lucas and Lonski (1992) examined
the credit ratings of more than 4,000 rated US and
international debt issues from 1970 to 1990 and found
that corporate creditworthiness became more volatile
over the period and that this increased volatility was
accompanied by a downward trend in ratings. Carty
and Fons (1994), using Moody’s database of over
4,700 long-term issues and 2,400 short-term issues,
found that trends in overall corporate credit quality,
as measured by the percentage of upgrades and
but may be thought of as 5 to 10 years. The reason
for using an indefinite horizon is that, for a given
constant rating, the probability of default varies
with different time horizons. While agencies have
been criticised, and at times rightly so, for being
vague as to the time horizon over which they are
rating, it would appear that if it is assumed that
they have always used a horizon of several years,
then their various statements are consistent.16
Ratings are a cardinal measure of credit risk
if used over an unspecified long horizon
(see Keenan, 1999, and Brand and Bahar, 1999).
Indeed, over the long term, ratings are found by
academic studies to be an accurate and unbiased
estimator of default probabilities. Thus, while
ratings are ordinal in their design, associations
can be drawn with cardinal probabilities of default
in the long term (see Keenan, 1999 and Brand and
Bahar, 1999). For shorter horizons, there is not
necessarily a stable mapping from ratings to
probability of loss, and the rating becomes an
ordinal measure of risk. Different agencies use
different concepts of loss, although in practice the




CRAs compare the fundamental credit analysis on
which ratings are based with market sentiment,
which is measured by quantitative indicators such
as the market price of corporate bonds and equities,
price volatility, the subordinated debt price, and
the credit default swap price. CRAs are adamant
that they do not directly incorporate market
sentiment into ratings, although they may use
market prices as a diagnostic tool. On the contrary,
they take care to exclude transient market
sentiment. The reason for this is that their clients,
in particular portfolio managers, have expressed
concern that the use of market sentiment as an
input would give rise to greater ratings volatility.
Portfolio managers prefer ratings to exhibit
stability, i.e. a degree of inertia in ratings changes.
Furthermore, the value of ratings based solely on
market sentiment/prices would be questionable,
as they would not incorporate any information that
is not already available to market participants.Market dynamics associated with credit ratings: a literature review
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19 For example, during the period from 1950 to 1980, on average 4.77% of issues changed ratings, while drift averaged a mere -0.07%. During the
period from 1980 to 1993, however, the average number of issuers experiencing ratings changes rose to 12.43%, while drift became more negative
at -4.97%.
20 There is some evidence, though less pronounced, of upward momentum (see Lando and Skødeberg, 2002, and Bangia et al., 2002).
downgrades of one or more letter, have changed over
time.19 They also noted a degree of predictability in
changes in credit ratings over time, and in particular
that rating changes tended to exhibit serial correlation.
More specifically, a downgrade is more likely to be
followed by a subsequent downgrade than by an
upgrade, i.e. credit ratings exhibit downward
momentum, which is evident for all grades.20
The existence of momentum in rating changes
implies that the history of past rating actions of
agencies should help predict their future actions,
which may suggest that agency ratings do not fully
reflect available information. As explained by Löffler
(2001), the “through-the-cycle” method of rating,
while able to explain important stylised facts such
as ratings stability, fails to account for the
predictability of rating changes. Furthermore,
infrequent reviews of ratings cannot explain serial
dependence in rating changes. Rating policy or
shortcomings in information processing (slow
reactions, biases, etc.) can, in principle, be put
forward as factors underlying the relatively weak
information content of credit ratings. Differentiating
between these alternative explanations, however,
is a daunting task. Löffler (2003) shows that
overlapping rating grades in terms of default
probabilities, which arise as a result of the
discreteness of the grades and efforts to avoid “rating
bounces” (e.g. fulfilling the market’s “expectation
for stable ratings”) (Cantor, 2001), would suffice to
generate momentum in rating changes. Blurred
differences in terms of default probabilities between
adjacent rating categories result from stickiness in
ratings. The ratings overlap then triggers the
subsequent gradual adjustment (momentum).
Rating changes exhibit a certain degree of procyclicality
As shown by Nickell et al. (2000), default
probabilities depend strongly on the stage in the
business cycle, and transition matrices tend to
exhibit a higher frequency of downgrades during a
recession and a higher occurrence of upgrades
during booms. However, without further
conditioning on measures of true underlying default
risk, which may in part be pro-cyclical, it is not
possible to conclude, by considering rating
transitions in terms of the state of the business cycle,
that ratings are assigned in a procyclical manner,
but only that ratings move procyclically. Such
evidence must nevertheless be squared with the
claim by the major CRAs that they rate
“through-the-expected cycle”.
Amato and Furfine (2002) note that, while the ratings
of most companies change little, significant evidence,
important from both a statistical and economic
perspective, points to ratings exhibiting sensitivity to
business cycle conditions. Rating agencies monitor the
conditions of companies to a greater or lesser extent
at any given time, and generally do not react to small
movements in their risk profiles. This is consistent
with the CRAs’ often-stated objective of taking a rating
action only “when it is unlikely to be reversed within
a relatively short period of time” (Cantor, 2001).
However, when rating agencies do make a change,
they overreact in relation to prevailing conditions, and
the nature of this overreaction positively correlates
with the state of the aggregate economy. This could
be the consequence of excessive optimism pessimism
during upturns downturns on the part of rating
agencies (see Amato and Furfine, 2002).
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Empirical models tend to indicate a rise in credit
risk during recessions. For instance, Altman et al.
(2002) show that there is a relationship between the
correlation of default probabilities and loss in the
event of default and the business cycle. These
authors argue that models that assume
independence of default probabilities and
loss-given-default will tend to underestimate the
probability of severe losses during economic
downturns. A study by Bangia et al. (2002)
demonstrates the empirical significance of the
procyclicality of credit quality changes by showing
that estimated credit losses are much higher in a
contraction than in an expansion. Kavvathas (2001),
who made a systematic study of the variation of
credit migration (including default risk) over the
business cycle, found that an increase in short and
long real rates, a lower equity return and a higher
equity return volatility were generally associated
with higher conditional downgrade probabilities.
The accuracy of credit rating transition probability
(CRTP) matrix forecasting, thanks to the use of state
variable information, has generally been improved,
both statistically and economically, in in-sample
and out-of-sample experiments. The statistical and
economic importance of the term structure and
equity return variables give rise to an interpretation
that may defuse some of the above mentioned
criticisms directed at the forward-looking nature of
the rating activity of CRAs. The fact that ratings,
according to the findings of Kavvathas (2001),
correlate contemporaneously with market variables
in an anticipated fashion, goes some way to
addressing this criticism. Nonetheless, empirical
evidence on ratings has to be interpreted with care,
since apparent violations of informational efficiency
could well result from the CRAs’ objectives and
constraints. Hence, their performance would need
to be compared with an appropriate benchmark.
Recently, literature has also focussed on whether
the severity of the ratings process has changed over
time. Specifically, Blume, Lim and MacKinlay (1998)
consider whether the recent trends in corporate bond
upgrades and downgrades are the result of the
declining credit quality of US corporate debt or
whether ratings standards have evolved over time.
Using ratings data from the period 1978-1995, they
argue that rating agencies have become more strict,
implying in part that the downward trend in ratings
is a result of changing standards.
3|2 Recent developments
in methodology:
structural changes or refinement?
International rating agencies strive to provide credit
assessments that hold generally steady through the
course of the business cycle (rating “through-the-cycle”).
However, in a “post-Enron” world, rating agencies
have been under considerable pressure from some
investors to provide more timely and accurate
readings of the credit outlook (see Morgan Stanley,
2003). Perhaps partly induced by this increased
pressure on rating agencies, market participants sense
a change in rating methodologies with ratings
becoming more sensitive to the business cycle.
The increased volatility that ratings have exhibited
in the recent period may have contributed to this
perception. Indeed, according to Moody’s, “the last
two years (2001 and 2002) have been atypically
volatile” with on average 28% of issuers experiencing
a rating change of any type, and 8% experiencing a
“large” (three or more notches) rating change
(the series hit an all-time high in 2001). In any typical
year, the corresponding figures are below 25%
(rating change of any type) and below 5%
(large rating change). Consequently, “rating
volatility... is currently at the highest level observed
since 1982” (see Moody’s Investors Service, 2003a).
Rating actions can be triggered by two types of factor:
changes in rating methodology and changes in
business and economic outlook. As regards changes
in methodology, as the reliance on ratings has been
growing, from a broadening base of market
participants, CRAs are expected to satisfy a variety of
constituencies, with different, if not sometimes
conflicting, interests: issuers and “traditional” asset
managers require more than a simple statement of
near-term probability of loss, but stress the need for
ratings to exhibit some degree of stability over time.
As regards the latter criterion, this desire for stability
is also motivated by the fact that ratings have become
pervasively embedded in investment guidelines and
bond indices, meaning that volatile or unexpected
rating changes can force asset managers to sell or
buy securities against their better judgement at
inopportune times. However, mark-to-market traders,
active investors and risk managers require frequent
indications of credit changes.Market dynamics associated with credit ratings: a literature review
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Consequently, the rating process and the range of
products offered by CRAs have evolved over time.
Renewed emphasis on communication
While notches (+/-, 1,2,3) were introduced between
1971 and 1982 by the major agencies in response to
these new demands, outlooks and watchlists were
developed more recently in order to provide
additional signals to rating users as to where the
balance of probabilities lies regarding future changes
in ratings or to attract attention to exceptional rating
reviews in the light of specific developments.
Notches and watchlists may be viewed as attempts
to give more timely indications of changes in credit
quality in response to allegations that the agencies
lagged market prices and were “behind the curve”.
As such, they are expected to contribute to
smoothing market reactions to rating changes by
providing early warning signals. At the same time,
rating review periods have been shortened in
response to investor criticism regarding the lack of
timeliness of rating actions. In May 2000, Moody’s
announced an improvement in communication and
transparency of ratings by indicating the likelihood
of future rating changes and their severity.
Emphasis on liquidity risks
Similarly, more emphasis has been placed on
liquidity risk, reflecting the recent shortcomings on
the part of rating agencies in accounting for this
factor in recent well-publicised defaults. New
products have been developed which aim to assess
the availability of short-term financing for
companies and take into account the increasing
volatility of financing conditions, especially for
speculative grade issuers: Liquidity risk assessments
(LRAs) for issuers of US commercial paper were
introduced in March 2002, the speculative grade
liquidity rating (SGLs) for speculative grade issuers
followed in September 2002.21 SGLs are opinions
about an issuer’s ability to generate cash from
internal sources, and the availability of external
sources of committed finance, relative to its cash
obligations over the coming 12 months. More
specifically, liquidity ratings are defined as a measure
of the impact that a loss of access to liquidity would
have on an issuer; and the short-term rating is
defined as a product of that impact and the
probability of occurrence of a loss of access.
Emphasis on “hidden” liabilities
In early 2003, Standard & Poor’s announced changes
in the framework for analysing financial measures
and ratios, in order to better reflect the potential
impact on corporate profitability of pension
liabilities that companies may carry, especially in
the current environment of low interest rates and
weak stock market performances.
Increased use of market-based tools
Rating agencies are making more extensive use of
quantitative and market-based methods to provide
additional perspectives in their credit risk
assessment process. Moody’s, for instance, is using
tools such as KMV to identify material and
systematic gaps between fundamental ratings and
ratings implied by market data. Similarly, the
renewed focus on event risks (litigation risks,
accounting irregularities, cash/debt-financed M&As
and share repurchase programmes) justifies, in
Moody’s view, this increased reliance on quantitative
risk models, in order to “capture” stock market
concerns and better reflect them in ratings (see, for
instance, “Implications of the acquisition of KMV
for Moody’s Ratings”, March 2002).
CRAs have also been developing “agency proxies”,
i.e. quantitative credit scoring models that analyse
financial statement data to produce default
probability predictions and/or quantitatively-derived
estimates of “traditional” credit ratings. While these
quantitative approaches are supposed to supplement
but not replace traditional ratings, there appears to
be some ambiguity in the definition of the role they
are expected to play alongside traditional credit
ratings. For instance, with a view to facilitating
market participants’ comprehension of the results
of the modelling process, the output of these models
can be expressed using traditional rating symbols.
Furthermore, as stated by Standard & Poor’s,
although scores are not credit opinions, “the scoring
models interpret the data in a way that is consistent
with how Standard & Poor’s analysts work” and “the
models reflect Standard & Poor’s specific credit
analysis experience and prospective views of each
industry.”
All these changes may indicate that credit signals
produced by rating agencies are becoming both more
21 See Moody’s Investors Service, March and September 2002.Market dynamics associated with credit ratings: a literature review
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diverse and generally more responsive to current
market conditions, which in turn arouses suspicions
that there may be a “post-Enron” regime change in
the rating process. At the same time, however, it is
interesting to note that rating agencies are publicly
stating that they are not pursuing active changes in
the way they conduct their rating process. They
reaffirm the value of rating stability and the meaning
of ratings as a long-term fundamental credit risk
assessment. Rating agencies believe that the market
does not look at ratings primarily as buy/sell signals,
and does not want ratings to be pro-cyclical or to
add to market volatility (see, for example, Moody’s
Investors Service, 2003b).
Although recent changes and refinements in rating
methodologies may have contributed to the
additional volatility in rating actions, the increase in
uncertainty about economic and business events is
perhaps the main factor behind this higher ratings
volatility. Rating agencies recognise that even for a
rating process that aims to produce long-term stable
ratings, periods of heightened credit and event stress
could contribute to a larger number of rating actions
than would have been historically expected on a
“normal” basis. On the basis of this argument, it
could be said that it is not a change in the rating
process (i.e. from a through-the-cycle to point-in-time
assessments) that is responsible for the recent higher
frequency of rating actions, but rather the increased
difficulty in seeing through the fog of economic
forecasts. It is this difficulty that makes the role of
rating analysis more challenging.
3|3 Accuracy, stability
and the “relative” procyclicality
of ratings
Although the recent increase in rating volatility may
to some extent have been due to an increase in
economic and business uncertainty, questions
remain as to whether this uncertainty will lead the
CRAs to adjust the weights they attach to different
objectives – accuracy and stability – in their rating
process more actively. Assessing the performance
of rating agencies with regard to these two objectives
can be done either in relation to the methodology
they use (i.e. do ratings provide an accurate and
stable picture of default risk “through-the-cycle”?)
or in relation to alternative credit risk measurement
techniques (i.e. how do signals provided by ratings
compare with other signals of credit risk?). This
latter approach is discussed below.
Obviously, aiming for accuracy and stability at the
same time involves a trade-off. Moody’s own
calculations illustrate that in terms of stability their
ratings outperform implied bond ratings (ratings
inferred from bond spreads) by a large margin.22 Over
the recent period (1999-2002), as a twelve-month
average, 25% of issuers experienced a rating action by
Moody’s. However, market-implied rating changes
affected 91% of the issuers. This general result also
holds for large rating changes (7% against 43%) and
rating reversals (1% against 76%), which are categories
that institutional investors are particularly concerned
with (see Moody’s Investors Service, 2003a).
As regards accuracy over a short horizon, however,
Moody’s ratings do not seem to match those of
market-based indicators. For a one-year horizon, for
example, bond market-implied ratings are, on average,
a better approximation of corporate defaults than
Moody’s ratings. As the time horizon lengthens, however,
the gap between these two measures is reduced.
Given their large outperformance with respect to
rating stability, it would be interesting to assess
whether CRAs are effectively becoming more
concerned with (short-term) accuracy, i.e. their
secondary objective. Such behaviour could be
reinforced by the fact that many market
participants and observers criticise rating agencies
for “being behind the curve” or “lagging the
market”, which might – although it is the natural
outcome of the CRAs’ traditional approach –
represent a threat to their all-important reputation.
In fact, Moody’s finds that, by historical standards,
the stability of its own ratings is currently low.
However, it may be too early to judge at this stage
whether this is the beginning of a trend. This
question nonetheless deserves close monitoring.
CRAs state that they purposely incorporate stability
into their ratings in response to demands from their
“core” client base. If indeed agencies’ primary client
base does not consist of mark-to-market investors
but of portfolio managers and issuers, then their
22 This result is consistent with another line of research which indicates that credit ratings assigned by the rating agencies give rise to much
smoother fluctuations in banks’ capital requirements within the Basel II framework as compared to Merton-type rating systems like KMV. See,
for example, P. Lowe, 2002; E. Catarineu-Rabell et al., 2003.Market dynamics associated with credit ratings: a literature review
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role is not only one of providing economies of scale
in information but also one of providing monitoring
signals in a principal-agent relation. These two roles,
however, necessitate a trade-off. Stability can be seen
as a device that affords the fund manager greater
discretion by smoothing cyclicality. The signal (the
rating) attempts to filter out the noise of every
fluctuation in market sentiment. A comparison may
be drawn with models that aim to forecast default
probabilities over a short time horizon (one year).
Such models, which draw heavily on market prices
and exhibit extreme cyclicality, appeal to mark-to-
market traders.
4| Policy implications and issues
4|1 Hardwiring versus flexibility
The paper has argued that ratings and rating changes
can potentially give rise to specific market dynamics.
However, it is worth stressing that such dynamics
are much more likely to be triggered by the way
ratings are used by market participants, far beyond
their initial purpose, than by the actual information
content of ratings themselves. The hardwiring of
rules and regulations into ratings, the proliferation
of ratings-based trigger clauses and the extensive
use of ratings in asset management have contributed
to turning ratings and rating agencies into structural
elements of modern financial markets. As a result,
rating changes may themselves become credit
events. In this context, in order to avoid rating
changes turning into automatic triggers for portfolio
restructuring and forced sales, it is crucial that, when
ratings are enshrined in regulations and rules and
hence potentially shape behaviour, enough
flexibility is afforded to market participants. The
challenge here is to strike the right balance between
the benefits of monitoring and disciplining that
ratings can provide and the “breathing space” that
market participants need in order to conduct their
activities efficiently. The change depicted in the
practices of the asset management industry,
i.e. moving away from strictly rule-based responses
to rating changes, illustrates this search for the
optimum combination.
4|2 Implications of the limited
short-term accuracy of ratings
Some of the empirical findings presented in this
paper regarding the lack of short-term accuracy of
ratings relative to other, market-based indicators
have implications that appear to be problematic for
capital market participants and bank regulators in
view of the increasing reliance on external ratings
issued by CRAs in credit assessments and in the
setting of economic capital by banks and capital
requirements by the authorities. The large divide
between ratings and market price-based credit risk
measures is manifest in individual credit spreads,
which vary greatly within a given rating category,
with a substantial degree of overlapping among
adjacent categories (some credit spreads in higher
categories are larger than others in lower categories).
As a result, ratings may not be efficient short-term
predictors of default (or credit quality deterioration)
– and, indeed, they are not designed to be. This
evidence does not necessarily contradict the (less
robust) finding that average credit spreads for each
rating category increase monotonically going down
the rating scale (i.e. ratings are generally
informative, as a lower credit rating corresponds to
a higher probability of default).
The degree of smoothing – the trade-off between
roles – is therefore essentially a matter of judgement:
if  changes in credit fundamentals are considered to
be minor or transient, no rating change is warranted,
and vice versa for large and permanent changes. One
way to measure the degree of smoothing is to assess
the volatility of ratings (compared, for instance, to
the volatility of market credit spreads). What is
surprising is that academic testing has, until recently
(see Löffler, 2001), virtually ignored this aspect of
ratings, preferring to treat them as rivals to market
prices that are deficient if they do not incorporate
every scrap of market information.Market dynamics associated with credit ratings: a literature review
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It could be argued that market price-based rating
systems may lead to more accurate credit risk
estimates and, in a regulatory capital setting, to more
timely changes in required capital than systems
based on external ratings (or ratings methodologies
similar to those used by the CRAs). This assumes,
however, that financial markets offer consistent and
reliable leading indicators of the business cycle.
Indeed, Moody’s has recently recognised that bond
market-implied ratings are more powerful than
Moody’s ratings over a one-year horizon (see Moody’s
Investors Service, 2003a, p. 25).
However, as some developments documented in this
study have shown, asset prices in general, and credit
spreads in particular, incorporate a large variety of
factors in addition to (market) estimates of credit risk.
Some of these factors can be viewed, in the context of
the setting of economic capital by banks and capital
requirements by the authorities, as transient events
or as noise that needs to be “filtered out”.
Ultimately, an appropriate balance must be struck
between the added value that incorporating relevant
market price information can bring to the credit
assessment process (accuracy) without at the same
time contributing to market fluctuations and giving
rise to unintended fluctuations in capital
requirements in the event of large swings in market
sentiment (stability).
4|3 Rating agency initiatives
and transparency
In the context of the current volatility of ratings,
disentangling the impact of economic uncertainty
(in itself very hard to assess) from possible changes
in the methodology used by rating agencies has
proved particularly difficult. The developments
reviewed above do not lead to the conclusion that
CRAs are in the process of changing their
methodology in favour of a more “point-in-time”
approach. However, CRAs have shown a very
“proactive” stance in recent years in refining their
approach to credit risk measurement and in adding
new products and tools to their initial range. From a
purely technical point of view, rating agencies now
possess instruments that could enable them to move
towards an increasing use of market-based models,
which are currently intended to complement but not
replace the traditional approach to credit rating.
Developments in this area are of interest to central
banks and policy makers. Faced with numerous
criticisms from some parties  in recent years, rating
agencies have made renewed efforts to justify their
actions and make their activity more transparent
and understandable. Results have been mixed to
date, with communication on, for instance, the long-
term performance of ratings clearly improving. But
few insights have been provided into the rating
process itself  (i.e. how ratings are arrived at), which
is an aspect that rating agencies consider to be to a
large extent proprietary. At the same time rating
agencies have devoted many resources to expanding
the range of rating products and credit risk modelling
tools they offer in order to keep pace with the needs
of market participants. Without additional
communication efforts, rating agencies may
ultimately be faced with a situation in which market
participants will encounter increasing difficulties
in understanding the interconnection between these
different rating products, and how they differ in the
context of an overall consistent approach. For
instance, how do LRAs interact with CP ratings and
issuer ratings? Similarly, the interactions between
the agencies’ “traditional” ratings approach and their
growing presence in the domain of the quantitative
modelling of credit risk needs to be clarified. Should
the perception develop that rating agencies are
sending blurred signals to the markets (appearing
either redundant or incoherent), this would have a
negative impact on both the agencies (loss of
credibility) and the functioning of the market.
4|4 Possible implications
of a change in methodology
All in all, precisely because ratings are widely used
by market participants, a move towards a more
market-based methodology would have far-reaching
implications for financial markets and financial
stability, and would be likely to result in an increase
in the risks of extreme price movements, especially
at the micro level. A key feature of ratings is that
they contain some information that is not
publicly-known and, furthermore, information
which is relevant to pricing. Most often, however,
ratings seem to incorporate only a small portion of
“new” information. Nevertheless, this does not mean
that ratings do not play an important role in
corporate bond markets, as they are liable to be very
valuable for less-informed investors given that they
translate risks into simple letters (i.e. a simple
ranking) and offer a long-term analysis based partlyMarket dynamics associated with credit ratings: a literature review
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on private information. More generally, because
rating agencies provide information economies of
scale, filtering and extracting noise from market
information, it can be said that they contribute to
the information efficiency of financial markets.
In the light of the empirical evidence on spreads
and spread dynamics provided above, a change
in rating methodology towards an exclusively
“point-in-time” approach would probably produce
ratings with no pricing-relevant information that
was not already provided by market prices. Hence,
the challenge facing rating agencies is rather to
adequately combine, in their credit assessment, the
input that market prices can provide with the
private information that they gather. Furthermore,
should ratings become more point-in-time, it is
likely that credit spreads would become more
volatile since the market would be more
frequently surprised. Presumably, however, the
increased volatility of ratings would ultimately
lead to changes in their use. For instance, as
regards rating triggers, it seems unlikely that the
contracts outstanding and new contracts issued
would rely solely on ratings if they were state-
dependent, i.e. if they changed over the business
cycle. Since there is both demand from lenders and
supply from borrowers for option-like features in
debt contracts, a more volatile rating environment
would probably lead to new solutions, with less
volatile features, which would, however, offer
lenders the same protection and borrowers a lower
spread. Under such circumstances, it is possible
that both creditors and borrowers would turn
back to conditional rating triggers, such as  super
poison put provisions. More generally, should
ratings become more point-in-time both lenders
and borrowers would bear increased costs as a
result of the higher volatility of ratings and a
decline in their information content.Market dynamics associated with credit ratings: a literature review
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23 Risk measures of default probabilities along the lines of DLIs have become popular among investors and are regularly supplied by commercial
providers such as KMV.
Appendix
A. Default risk
and the informational efficiency
of rating changes:
evidence from capital markets
A number of academic papers have investigated the
informational efficiency of ratings in relation to the
level of and changes in default risk. Some of these
studies tested the consistency of ratings across
industrial segments and geographical regions. Ammer
and Packer (2000) showed that, in some years,
US financial companies obtained higher ratings than
other companies with similar annual default risks.
Cantor and al. (2001) also examined inconsistencies
across several groups. These studies did not set out to
control for inconsistencies across narrower sectors or
to determine any company-specific variables, such as
size or leverage. They only took account of Moody’s
ratings and did not address the question of the
information provided by credit rating sub-categories.
Galil (2002) examined the quality of corporate credit
ratings in relation to their default prediction power.
He focused on whether ratings efficiently
incorporate publicly-available information at the
time of rating, the extent to which rating
classifications are informative and whether rating
classifications are consistent across industries and
countries of incorporation. The results reveal that
ratings could be improved by using publicly-
available information such as size, leverage and
availability of collateral. Therefore, combining such
public information (industry classification) with
ratings could produce a better assessment of default
risk. Despite the fact that ratings have some
undesired qualities, the real informational content
of ratings cannot be disregarded. Ratings provide a
better assessment of default risk than public
information alone. This result is consistent with the
findings of Kliger and Sarig (2000) and may confirm
that CRA activity adds value, even though ex-post
ratings are not found to be entirely consistent across
industries and the narrowness of rating categories
is found to be not particularly informative. Since
these results hold ex-post, the argument that ratings
are optimal ex-ante, even if a sample includes ratings
over a long period (1983-1993) and the period of
exposure to default risk is even longer (1983-2000), is
hard to refute. For example, the fact that Standard & Poor’s
underestimated the risks in some industries at the
time it assigned its ratings might have been due to
an unexpected shock during the sample period.
Vassalou and Xing (2003) provide new insights into
the informational content of bond upgrades and
downgrades. They show that default risk varies too
much over time for credit ratings to provide any
useful information about the future default risk of a
company. Furthermore, their results imply that
grouping stocks according to their credit ratings
(A, B, or C) provides almost identical information
about default risk as a classification of companies
into size or book-to-market (BM) tertiles. Using an
alternative-to-bond-ratings measure of default risk,
they are able to show that stocks with large increases
in their default risk earn significantly higher
subsequent returns than stocks with large decreases
in their default risk. This result is consistent with
economic intuition which dictates that investors will
require a higher return to hold stocks with higher
(default) risk. They reconcile the two sets of results
by introducing a forward-looking measure of default
risk based on the contingent claims approach of
Merton (1974). This measure, known as the
default likelihood indicator (DLI), gives the
company’s default probability23 and can be updated
frequently (e.g. every month). It therefore stands a
chance of providing a better estimate of the
company’s current default probabilities than a bond
rating, which is typically not updated more often
than once a year.
Vassalou and Xing compare changes in DLIs with
changes in credit ratings. In the case of downgrades,
the results show that the average DLI for all
downgrades starts increasing about two to three years
prior to the downgrade, and reaches its peak at time
zero, the date of the downgrade announcement. This
result was largely to be expected, since some
substantial change in the default risk of a company
has to occur in order for a downgrade to take place.
What is surprising, however, is the fact that, following
the downgrade, the average DLI starts decreasing at
about the same rate at which it previously increased.
Furthermore, it returns to almost the same level it
had three years prior to the downgrade. In other
words, the graph of average DLI as a function of time
around the downgrade (plus-minus 36 months)
has an inverted V shape, with the peak at the
announcement date of the downgrade.Market dynamics associated with credit ratings: a literature review
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24 In the Delianedis and Geske (2003) study of approximately 12 years (1988-1999) of US corporations rated by S&P on Compustat, the number of
rating migrations other than to default (1,800) was about 100 times greater than the number of migrations to default (18), after screening for
sufficient CRSP and Compustat data.
The above finding implies that equity returns
following a downgrade should be lower, given that
the company’s default risk is lower. It also implies
that it is important to adjust for the variation in
the DLI when calculating abnormal equity returns
following a downgrade. Indeed, if equity returns
are adjusted not only for size and BM but also for
DLI, the short-horizon negative abnormal equity
returns found in Dichev and Piotroski (2001)
disappear. Some negative abnormal returns are still
found in the two to three-year horizon. However,
about 42% of stocks with a downgrade experience
subsequent downgrades in the three-year period
following the initial one. When this fact is also taken
into account, the economically significant negative
abnormal returns disappear completely.
The inverted V pattern in the DLI around
downgrades is most pronounced for companies with
C-grade debt, with the rate of change in default risk
being particularly high during the year surrounding
the announcement of the downgrade. The change
in default risk in the period around the downgrade
is less pronounced in the case of companies with
grade B debt, and non-existent in the case of firms
with grade A debt.
These results are consistent with those of Dichev
and Piotroski (2001) in the sense that they explain
why the negative returns following a downgrade are
most pronounced for small non-investment grade
companies. The reason is that most companies with
low-grade debt are small, and the reduction in
default risk following a downgrade is steeper in their
case than it is for larger, investment grade
companies. Therefore, in those cases, it is even more
important to take into account the DLI of the
companies in calculating their abnormal returns.
The picture that emerges in the case of upgrades is
quite different from that described above. The line
of average DLI for all companies is almost flat, with
a slight dip on the announcement date of the
upgrade. This dip is so small, that it cannot possibly
be associated with a significant increase in
subsequent equity returns. We observe a rapid
decrease in default risk for grade C companies prior
to an upgrade, but the increase subsequent to the
announcement date is again too small to give rise
to large positive returns.
The asymmetry observed in previous studies in the
reaction of equity returns to downgrades and
upgrades can be explained by the asymmetric change
in average DLI associated with credit rating changes,
depending on the nature of the event (i.e. upgrade
or downgrade). DLI varies a lot around downgrades,
but not around upgrades. Therefore, adjusting for
DLI in calculating abnormal equity returns following
downgrades is essential, whereas it is immaterial
in the case of upgrades, since DLI exhibits little, if
any, variation in the latter case.
B. Credit risk and transition matrices
The value of most fixed income securities is inversely
related to the probability of default. Thus, fixed
income investors are very concerned about changes
in the value of their investments due to changes in
the probability of default, even though actual default
seldom occurs. In fact, fixed income investors may
be more concerned with changes in the perceived
credit quality of their bond holdings than with actual
default, because bond spreads react to credit risk and
affect the performance of bond portfolio managers.
Rating migrations, which offer one reflection of
changes in the perceived quality of bonds, occur much
more frequently than defaults.24
Rating agencies regularly measure the historical
default frequency of both US and non-US corporate
issuers. While these historical default frequencies
are of interest, they are not forward-looking. The
same argument applies to historical transition
matrices computed from past frequencies of rating
migrations. As mentioned above, the DLI measure
of default probability, based on option theory and
computed from stock market data, can provide
information about expected changes in credit risk.
Corporate bond spreads should also reflect such
expected changes in credit risk (migration).
Delianedis and Geske (2003) focus on the information
contained in (risk neutral) default probabilities,
derived according to the Merton (1974) and
Geske (1977) models. These models were used to
estimate a monthly time series of risk neutral default
probabilities over approximately 12 years, from 1988
to 1999. In examining the changes in these default
probabilities before the event of a rating migrationMarket dynamics associated with credit ratings: a literature review
72 Banque de France • Financial Stability Review • No. 4 • June 2004
or default, there appears to be significant leading
information about rating migrations and about
defaults in these forward-looking risk-neutral
probabilities of default. The term structure of default
probabilities from the Geske model appears to contain
additional information. The short-term probability
of default from the Geske model appears to contain
significant information about both the default event
and the shape of the term structure of default
probabilities prior to the actual default. It appears
that this short term default probability is able to
distinguish impending cash flow problems for the
company. Furthermore, rating migrations and
defaults do not appear to be a surprise to the market
since they can be detected months in advance by
either model.
Credit migration or transition matrices, which depict
the past changes in credit quality of obligors
(typically companies), are essential inputs in many
risk management applications, including portfolio
risk assessment, the modelling of the term structure
of credit risk premia, and the pricing of credit
derivatives. Risk management tools, such as
CreditMetrics, specifically utilise credit migration
measures as one of their primary inputs. Ratings
changes reflect an agency’s assessment that a
company’s credit quality has improved (upgrade)
or deteriorated (downgrade).
The issue of credit quality migration is very important
for fixed-income investors, institutions, regulators,
and managers of credit risk. Investors are concerned
with the migration of ratings, because it influences
the price of a bond. Institutions are concerned with
ratings changes because of internal policies limiting
the percentage of below-investment-grade loans that
banks permit themselves to hold. Regulators are
concerned with ratings since in some cases they
determine investment eligibility of assets and
valuation for capital determination. In the New Basel
Accord (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision,
2001) capital requirements are driven in part
by ratings migration. Their accurate estimation is
therefore critical.
Transition matrices measure the probability of a
credit rating being upgraded or downgraded within
a specific time period. Standard & Poor’s and
Moody’s both look at the rating migration of credit
quality in all ratings categories for various time
horizons, including one, five and ten years, and in
some cases longer. The transition matrices issued
by the major rating agencies include all industrial
and transportation companies, utilities, financial
institutions and sovereigns that have issued
long-term debt to the public. Transition matrices are
calculated by comparing beginning-of-period ratings
to end-of-period ratings. Transition matrices focus on
two distinct points in time, typically the first and last
day of a year, and ignore any intervening changes.
Standard & Poor’s transition matrices use the implied
senior unsecured rating of each issuer, regardless
of the size of a particular issue or the number of
shares outstanding from that particular issue.
Similarly, Moody’s relies upon an implied senior
unsecured rating of the issuer, rather than the ratings
of individual debt instruments.
Several academic studies have taken a slightly
different approach to measuring and reporting rating
transitions. Altman (1989) and Altman and Kao
(1992) were the first to take an approach to
constructing transition matrices which assesses the
changes from an initial bond rating, usually at the
time of issuance. They argue that this distinction is
important because of an ageing or seasoning effect
that is observable in the early years after issuance
and that such an effect generally disappears within
four to five years. This result is intuitively appealing
because, as Altman (1998) notes, as time passes
strong companies are able to call or repurchase their
debt and refinance it with lower coupon issues.
Thus, the remaining pools of issuers naturally
display higher default/transition rates. Besides
cohort or pool construction, there are two other
important differences in how Altman and Kao (1992)
construct transition matrices. First, Altman and Kao
transitions are based on the ratings of specific issues,
rather than the implied senior unsecured rating of
issuers. Second, unlike the rating agencies, Altman
and Kao do not include the ratings category
“withdrawn” when reporting their transition
matrices. The primary difference that arises when
comparing the two ways of constructing transition
matrices is that the pools or cohorts tracked by the
major rating agencies contain portfolios of both
seasoned and new-issue bonds. Issues of
construction aside, comparing transition matrices
is problematic because of the different time periods
covered by the raters’ data. Moreover, changes in
the number and types of debt issues, the industries
rated, and initial credit quality over those time
periods exacerbate the difficulties in making direct
comparisons between transition matrices.Market dynamics associated with credit ratings: a literature review
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25 This difference is likely to decrease for shorter horizon matrices (e.g. quarterly or monthly), but increase for longer, multi-year horizon.
C. Credit migration estimates:
methods and risk measurement
implications
At least two estimation techniques have been
suggested in the literature: the standard frequentist
(cohort) approach and the duration (hazard)
approach. The latter, which uses the transition
information by obligor more efficiently than does the
cohort method, also enables proper testing for time
homogeneity and non-homogeneity of the transition
matrix (the distance between dates, but not the dates
themselves, influences the transition probability).
The frequentist method, which is the current industry
standard, estimates the transition probability as a
simple proportion of companies at the end of the
sampling period (horizon) (e.g. at the end of the year
for an annual matrix) with rating j having started out
with rating i. Typically, any rating change activity
which occurs within the period (horizon) is ignored
and companies whose ratings were withdrawn or
migrate to “not rated” (NR) status are removed from
the sample. In addition, two critical aspects are
ignored in the cohort method: (right) censoring,
which means that what happens to the company after
the sample window closes is not known (e.g. does it
default right away or does it live on until the present),
and (left) truncation, which means that companies
only enter sample if they have survived long enough
or have received a rating. These issues are addressed
by the duration approach (see Schuermann and Jafry,
2003) in which the estimation method varies,
accepting or relaxing the time homogeneity
assumption. Statistically significant differences in
migration matrices estimated by the cohort and
duration approaches do indeed arise for a one-year
horizon, which is typical in many risk management
applications.25 However, such differences are
confined to the homogenous duration and cohort
methods; relaxing the time homogeneity assumption
would appear to yield little difference. Thus, the
non-Markovian behaviour hypothesis of the rating
process would not be materially significant. This
conclusion, however, seems to contrast somewhat
with the estimates reported in Kavvathas (2001).
Similarly, looking at the economic significance of
such differences, the measurement of credit risk
capital implies a divergence between the cohort and
the duration method of the same order as that implied
by business cycles which, in turn, is about 40%
(excess capital that should be held during a recession
over the optimal level set during an expansion
– see Bangia et al., 2002). Credit pricing is also affected
substantially when the estimated matrices differ
significantly; using the “wrong” matrix can lead to
mis-pricing by over 50%.Market dynamics associated with credit ratings: a literature review
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